BOOK I PART III
ject in the same manner with you; immediately
conceives it in a different manner, and has dif-
ferent ideas of it. This answer is unsatisfactory;
not because it contains any falshood, but be-
cause it discovers not all the truth. It is contest,
that in all cases, wherein we dissent from any
person, we conceive both sides of the question;
but as we can believe only one, it evidently fol-
lows, that the belief must make some differ-
ence betwixt that conception to which we as-
sent, and that from which we dissent. We may
mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound,
and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways;
but until there appears some principle, which
fixes one of these different situations, we have
in reality no opinion: And this principle, as
it plainly makes no addition to our precedent
ideas, can only change the manner of our con-
ceiving them.