BOOK I PART III
are derived from the same principles; that their
effects in informing and enlivening our ideas
are the same; and that belief is nothing but a
more forcible and vivid conception of an idea;
it should follow, that that action of the mind
may not only be derived from the relation of
cause and effect, but also from those of contigu-
ity and resemblance. But as we find by experi-
ence, that belief arises only from causation, and
that we can draw no inference from one object
to another, except they be connected by this re-
lation, we may conclude, that there is some er-
ror in that reasoning, which leads us into such
difficulties.
This is the objection; let us now consider
its solution. It is evident, that whatever is
present to the memory, striking upon the mind
with a vivacity, which resembles an immedi-