BOOK I PART III
is an artificial and not a natural cause, and as
its maxims are frequently contrary to reason,
and even to themselves in different times and
places, it is never upon that account recognized
by philosophers; though in reality it be built al-
most on the same foundation of custom and
repetition as our reasonings from causes and
effects.^7
(^7) In general we may observe, that as our assent to all
probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas,
It resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices,
which are rejected under the opprobrious character of
being the offspring of the imagination. By this expres-
sion it appears that the word, imagination, is commonly
usd in two different senses; and tho nothing be more
contrary to true philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in
the following reasonings I have often been obligd to fall
into it. When I oppose the Imagination to the mem-
ory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter
ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same