BOOK I PART III
instance, that falls under our observation. The
first instance has little or no force: The second
makes some addition to it: The third becomes
still more sensible; and it is by these slow steps,
that our judgment arrives at a full assurance.
But before it attains this pitch of perfection, it
passes through several inferior degrees, and in
all of them is only to be esteemed a presump-
tion or probability. The gradation, therefore,
from probabilities to proofs is in many cases in-
sensible; and the difference betwixt these kinds
of evidence is more easily perceived in the re-
mote degrees, than in the near and contiguous.
It is worthy of remark on this occasion,
that though the species of probability here ex-
plained be the first in order, and naturally takes
place before any entire proof can exist, yet no
one, who is arrived at the age of maturity, can