BOOK I PART III
ences we draw from contrary phaenomena:
though I am perswaded, that upon examina-
tion we shall not find it to be the principle, that
most commonly influences the mind in this
species of reasoning. When we follow only the
habitual determination of the mind, we make
the transition without any reflection, and inter-
pose not a moment’s delay betwixt the view of
one object and the belief of that, which is often
found to attend it. As the custom depends not
upon any deliberation, it operates immediately,
without allowing any time for reflection. But
this method of proceeding we have but few in-
stances of in our probable reasonings; and even
fewer than in those, which are derived from
the uninterrupted conjunction of objects. In the
former species of reasoning we commonly take
knowingly into consideration the contrariety of
past events; we compare the different sides of