BOOK I PART III
the contrariety, and carefully weigh the exper-
iments, which we have on each side: Whence
we may conclude, that our reasonings of this
kind arise not directly from the habit, but in an
oblique manner; which we must now endeav-
our to explain.
It is evident, that when an object is attended
with contrary effects, we judge of them only by
our past experience, and always consider those
as possible, which we have observed to follow
from it. And as past experience regulates our
judgment concerning the possibility of these ef-
fects, so it does that concerning their probabil-
ity; and that effect, which has been the most
common, we always esteem the most likely.
Here then are two things to be considered, viz.
the reasons which determine us to make the
past a standard for the future, and the manner