BOOK I PART III
The component parts of the probability and
possibility, being alike in their nature, must
produce like effects; and the likeness of their ef-
fects consists in this, that each of them presents
a view of a particular object. But though these
parts be alike in their nature, they are very dif-
ferent in their quantity and number; and this
difference must appear in the effect as well as
the similarity. Now as the view they present is
in both cases full and entire, and comprehends
the object in all its parts, it is impossible that
in this particular there can be any difference;
nor is there any thing but a superior vivacity in
the probability, arising from the concurrence of
a superior number of views, which can distin-
guish these effects.
Here is almost the same argument in a dif-
ferent light. All our reasonings concerning the