BOOK I PART III
tions, which may deserve our attention. The
FIRST may be explained after this manner.
When the mind forms a reasoning concerning
any matter of fact, which is only probable, it
casts its eye backward upon past experience,
and transferring it to the future, is presented
with so many contrary views of its object, of
which those that are of the same kind unit-
ing together, and running into one act of the
mind, serve to fortify and inliven it. But sup-
pose that this multitude of views or glimpses
of an object proceeds not from experience, but
from a voluntary act of the imagination; this
effect does not follow, or at least, follows not
in the same degree. For though custom and
education produce belief by such a repetition,
as is not derived from experience, yet this re-
quires a long tract of time, along with a very
frequent and undesigned repetition. In general