BOOK I PART III
returns, and the danger seems less certain and
real.
I add, as a third instance of this kind, that
though our reasonings from proofs and from
probabilities be considerably different from
each other, yet the former species of reason-
ing often degenerates insensibly into the latter,
by nothing but the multitude of connected ar-
guments. It is certain, that when an inference
is drawn immediately from an object, without
any intermediate cause or effect, the convic-
tion is much stronger, and the persuasion more
lively, than when the imagination is carryed
through a long chain of connected arguments,
however infallible the connexion of each link
may be esteemed. It is from the original im-
pression, that the vivacity of all the ideas is de-
rived, by means of the customary transition of