BOOK I PART III
this nation as much as any other.
Should it be demanded why men form gen-
eral rules, and allow them to influence their
judgment, even contrary to present observa-
tion and experience, I should reply, that in
my opinion it proceeds from those very princi-
ples, on which all judgments concerning causes
and effects depend. Our judgments concerning
cause and effect are derived from habit and ex-
perience; and when we have been accustomed
to see one object united to another, our imag-
ination passes from the first to the second, by
a natural transition, which precedes reflection,
and which cannot be prevented by it. Now it is
the nature of custom not only to operate with
its full force, when objects are presented, that
are exactly the same with those to which we
have been accustomed; but also to operate in an