BOOK I PART III
sible to exclude from our thought all particular
degrees of quantity and quality as from the real
nature of things. If we be possest, therefore, of
any idea of power in general, we must also be
able to conceive some particular species of it;
and as power cannot subsist alone, but is al-
ways regarded as an attribute of some being or
existence, we must be able to place this power
in some particular being, and conceive that be-
ing as endowed with a real force and energy,
by which such a particular effect necessarily re-
sults from its operation. We must distinctly and
particularly conceive the connexion betwixt the
cause and effect, and be able to pronounce,
from a simple view of the one, that it must be
followed or preceded by the other. This is the
true manner of conceiving a particular power
in a particular body: and a general idea be-
ing impossible without an individual; where