BOOK I PART III
to see if possibly we can discover the nature
and origin of those ideas, we annex to them.
Suppose two objects to be presented to us, of
which the one is the cause and the other the ef-
fect; it is plain, that from the simple considera-
tion of one, or both these objects we never shall
perceive the tie by which they are united, or be
able certainly to pronounce, that there is a con-
nexion betwixt them. It is not, therefore, from
any one instance, that we arrive at the idea of
cause and effect, of a necessary connexion of
power, of force, of energy, and of efficacy. Did
we never see any but particular conjunctions of
objects, entirely different from each other, we
should never be able to form any such ideas.
But again; suppose we observe several in-
stances, in which the same objects are always
conjoined together, we immediately conceive a