BOOK I PART III
cession and contiguity discovers nothing new
in any one of them: since we can draw no infer-
ence from it, nor make it a subject either of our
demonstrative or probable reasonings;(Sect. 6.)
as has been already proved. Nay suppose we
coued draw an inference, it would be of no
consequence in the present case; since no kind
of reasoning can give rise to a new idea, such
as this of power is; but wherever we reason,
we must antecedently be possest of clear ideas,
which may be the objects of our reasoning. The
conception always precedes the understand-
ing; and where the one is obscure, the other is
uncertain; where the one fails, the other must
fail also.
Secondly, It is certain that this repetition of
similar objects in similar situations produces
nothing new either in these objects, or in any