BOOK I PART III
are led astray by a false philosophy. This is the
case, when we transfer the determination of the
thought to external objects, and suppose any
real intelligible connexion betwixt them; that
being a quality, which can only belong to the
mind that considers them.
As to what may be said, that the operations
of nature are independent of our thought and
reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have ob-
served, that objects bear to each other the re-
lations of contiguity and succession: that like
objects may be observed in several instances
to have like relations; and that all this is inde-
pendent of, and antecedent to the operations of
the understanding. But if we go any farther,
and ascribe a power or necessary connexion to
these objects; this is what we can never observe
in them, but must draw the idea of it from what