BOOK I PART III
this seemingly preposterous manner, and make
use of terms before we were able exactly to de-
fine them, or fix their meaning. We shall now
correct this fault by giving a precise definition
of cause and effect.
There may two definitions be given of this
relation, which are only different, by their pre-
senting a different view of the same object, and
making us consider it either as a philosophi-
cal or as a natural relation; either as a com-
parison of two ideas, or as an association be-
twixt them. We may define acauseto be An ob-
ject precedent and contiguous to another, and
where all the objects resembling the former are
placed in like relations of precedency and con-
tiguity to those objects that resemble the latter.
I If this definition be esteemed defective, be-
cause drawn from objects foreign to the cause,