BOOK I PART III
vailed in philosophy. First, We may learn from
the foregoing, doctrine, that all causes are of
the same kind, and that in particular there is
no foundation for that distinction, which we
sometimes make betwixt efficient causes and
causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes,
and formal, and material, and exemplary, and
final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is de-
rived from the constant conjunction of two ob-
jects, wherever this is observed, the cause is ef-
ficient; and where it is not, there can never be
a cause of any kind. For the same reason we
must reject the distinction betwixt cause and
occasion, when supposed to signify any thing
essentially different from each other. If con-
stant conjunction be implyed in what we call
occasion, it is a real cause. If not, it is no rela-
tion at all, and cannot give rise to any argument
or reasoning.