BOOK I PART IV
have, and usually has, a greater assurance in
his opinions, than one that is foolish and igno-
rant, and that our sentiments have different de-
grees of authority, even with ourselves, in pro-
portion to the degrees of our reason and expe-
rience. In the man of the best sense and longest
experience, this authority is never entire; since
even such-a-one must be conscious of many er-
rors in the past, and must still dread the like
for the future. Here then arises a new species of
probability to correct and regulate the first, and
fix its just standard and proportion. As demon-
stration is subject to the controul of probability,
so is probability liable to a new correction by
a reflex act of the mind, wherein the nature of
our understanding, and our reasoning from the
first probability become our objects.
Having thus found in every probability, be-