BOOK I PART IV
dency of our perceptions. Mean while we may
observe that when we talk of real distinct ex-
istences, we have commonly more in our eye
their independency than external situation in
place, and think an object has a sufficient real-
ity, when its Being is uninterrupted, and inde-
pendent of the incessant revolutions, which we
are conscious of in ourselves.
Thus to resume what I have said concerning
the senses; they give us no notion of continued
existence, because they cannot operate beyond
the extent, in which they really operate. They
as little produce the opinion of a distinct exis-
tence, because they neither can offer it to the
mind as represented, nor as original. To offer it
as represented, they must present both an ob-
ject and an image. To make it appear as origi-
nal, they must convey a falshood; and this fals-