BOOK I PART IV
deed, whatever convincing arguments philoso-
phers may fancy they can produce to estab-
lish the belief of objects independent of the
mind, it is obvious these arguments are known
but to very few, and that it is not by them,
that children, peasants, and the greatest part
of mankind are induced to attribute objects to
some impressions, and deny them to others.
Accordingly we find, that all the conclusions,
which the vulgar form on this head, are directly
contrary to those, which are confirmed by phi-
losophy. For philosophy informs us, that every
thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing
but a perception, and is interrupted, and de-
pendent on the mind: whereas the vulgar con-
found perceptions and objects, and attribute a
distinct continued existence to the very things
they feel or see. This sentiment, then, as it is en-
tirely unreasonable, must proceed from some