BOOK I PART IV
may observe, that the view of any one object is
not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. For
in that proposition, an object is the same with
itself, if the idea expressed by the word, object,
were no ways distinguished from that meant
by itself; we really should mean nothing, nor
would the proposition contain a predicate and
a subject, which however are implyed in this
affirmation. One single object conveys the idea
of unity, not that of identity.
On the other hand, a multiplicity of objects
can never convey this idea, however resem-
bling they may be supposed. The mind al-
ways pronounces the one not to be the other,
and considers them as forming two, three, or
any determinate number of objects, whose ex-
istences are entirely distinct and independent.
Since then both number and unity are incom-