BOOK I PART IV
senses. I shall be sure to give warning, when I
return to a more philosophical way of speaking
and thinking.
To enter, therefore, upon the question con-
cerning the source of the error and deception
with regard to identity, when we attribute it
to our resembling perceptions, notwithstand-
ing their interruption; I must here recal an ob-
servation, which I have already provd and ex-
plaind (Part II. Sect. 5.). Nothing is more apt to
make us mistake one idea for another, than any
relation betwixt them, which associates them
together in the imagination, and makes it pass
with facility from one to the other. Of all re-
lations, that of resemblance is in this respect
the most efficacious; and that because it not
only causes an association of ideas, but also of
dispositions, and makes us conceive the one