BOOK I PART I
can be more distant than such or such things from
each other, nothing can have less relation: as if dis-
tance and relation were incompatible.
It may perhaps be esteemed an endless task
to enumerate all those qualities, which make
objects admit of comparison, and by which the
ideas of philosophical relation are produced.
But if we diligently consider them, we shall
find that without difficulty they may be com-
prised under seven general heads, which may
be considered as the sources of all philosophi-
cal relation.
(1) The first isresemblance: And this is a re-
lation, without which no philosophical relation
can exist; since no objects will admit of com-
parison, but what have some degree of resem-
blance. But though resemblance be necessary
to all philosophical relation, it does not follow,