BOOK I PART IV
position in the case: at least so long as these
rejections retain any force or vivacity. In or-
der to set ourselves at ease in this particular,
we contrive a new hypothesis, which seems
to comprehend both these principles of reason
and imagination. This hypothesis is the philo-
sophical, one of the double existence of per-
ceptions and objects; which pleases our rea-
son, in allowing, that our dependent percep-
tions are interrupted and different; and at the
same time is agreeable to the imagination, in
attributing a continued existence to something
else, which we call objects. This philosophical
system, therefore, is the monstrous offspring
of two principles, which are contrary to each
other, which are both at once embraced by the
mind, and which are unable mutually to de-
stroy each other. The imagination tells us, that
our resembling perceptions have a continued