BOOK I PART IV
suppose external objects to resemble internal
perceptions. I have already shewn, that the re-
lation of cause and effect can never afford us
any just conclusion from the existence or qual-
ities of our perceptions to the existence of ex-
ternal continued objects: And I shall farther
add, that even though they coued afford such
a conclusion, we should never have any reason
to infer, that our objects resemble our percep-
tions. That opinion, therefore, is derived from
nothing but the quality of the fancy above-
explained, <that it borrows all its ideas from
some precedent perception>. We never can
conceive any thing but perceptions, and there-
fore must make every thing resemble them.
Secondly, As we suppose our objects in gen-
eral to resemble our perceptions, so we take it
for granted, that every particular object resem-