BOOK I PART IV
regard to substances and substantial forms; nor
can we forbear looking upon colours, sounds,
tastes, figures, and other properties of bodies,
as existences, which cannot subsist apart, but
require a subject of inhesion to sustain and sup-
port them. For having never discovered any of
these sensible qualities, where, for the reasons
above-mentioned, we did not likewise fancy a
substance to exist; the same habit, which makes
us infer a connexion betwixt cause and effect,
makes us here infer a dependence of every
quality on the unknown substance. The custom
of imagining a dependence has the same effect
as the custom of observing it would have. This
conceit, however, is no more reasonable than
any of the foregoing. Every quality being a dis-
tinct thing from another, may be conceived to
exist apart, and may exist apart, not only from
every other quality, but from that unintelligible