BOOK I PART IV
extend to the impression: And that because the
quality of the object, upon which the argument
is founded, must at least be conceived by the
mind; and coued not be conceived, unless it
were common to an impression; since we have
no idea but what is derived from that origin.
Thus we may establish it as a certain maxim,
that we can never, by any principle, but by an
irregular kind (Such as that of Sect. 2, form
the coherence of our perceptions.) of reason-
ing from experience, discover a connexion or
repugnance betwixt objects, which extends not
to impressions; though the inverse proposition
may not be equally true, that all the discov-
erable relations of impressions are common to
objects.
To apply this to the present case; there are
two different systems of being presented, to