BOOK I PART IV
is susceptible, and as these never afford us any
idea of thought or perception, it is concluded to
be impossible, that thought can ever be caused
by matter.
Few have been able to withstand the seem-
ing evidence of this argument; and yet noth-
ing in the world is more easy than to refute it.
We need only reflect on what has been proved
at large, that we are never sensible of any con-
nexion betwixt causes and effects, and that it is
only by our experience of their constant con-
junction, we can arrive at any knowledge of
this relation. Now as all objects, which are not
contrary, are susceptible of a constant conjunc-
tion, and as no real objects are contrary (Part
III. Sect. 15.); I have inferred from these prin-
ciples, that to consider the mattera priori, any
thing may produce any thing, and that we shall