BOOK II PART II
which by their opposition destroy each other.
But if we consider, on the other hand, that this
transition from the sensation to the affection
is not forwarded by any principle, that pro-
duces a transition of ideas; but, on the contrary,
that though the one impression be easily trans-
fused into the other, yet the change of objects
is supposed contrary to all the principles, that
cause a transition of that kind; we may from
thence infer, that nothing will ever be a steady
or durable cause of any passion, that is con-
nected with the passion merely by a relation
of impressions. What our reason would con-
clude from analogy, after balancing these ar-
guments, would be, that an object, which pro-
duces pleasure or uneasiness, but has no man-
ner of connexion either with ourselves or oth-
ers, may give such a turn to the disposition, as
that may naturally fall into pride or love, hu-