BOOK I PART II
must consist of an infinite number of parts, and
that it is impossible to set any bounds to the
number of parts, without setting bounds at the
same time to the division. It requires scarce
any, induction to conclude from hence, that the
idea, which we form of any finite quality, is not
infinitely divisible, but that by proper distinc-
tions and separations we may run up this idea
to inferior ones, which will be perfectly simple
and indivisible. In rejecting the infinite capac-
ity of the mind, we suppose it may arrive at an
end in the division of its ideas; nor are there
any possible means of evading the evidence of
this conclusion.
It is therefore certain, that the imagination
reaches a minimum, and may raise up to it-
self an idea, of which it cannot conceive any
sub-division, and which cannot be diminished