BOOK II PART II
To illustrate this doctrine by a parallel in-
stance, we may observe, that not only the un-
easiness, which proceeds from another by acci-
dent, has but little force to excite our passion,
but also that which arises from an acknowl-
edged necessity and duty. One that has a real
design of harming us, proceeding not from ha-
tred and ill-will, but from justice and equity,
draws not upon him our anger, if we be in any
degree reasonable; notwithstanding he is both
the cause, and the knowing cause of our suffer-
ings. Let us examine a little this phaenomenon.
It is evident in the first place, that this cir-
cumstance is not decisive; and though it may
be able to diminish the passions, it is seldom it
can entirely remove them. How few criminals
are there, who have no ill-will to the person,
that accuses them, or to the judge, that con-