VI PREFACE
factor in the plans, fears, and aspirations of Cuba's political
leaders as they sought to turn American policy to their
personal advantage.
Yet United States policy-makers were only half-aware of
the implications of their relationship with Cuba. They assumed
that the orderly transfer of power in a system of government
was the irreducible condition of stability, in American usage,
for it represented the violence-free accommodation of com
peting interest groups within the body politic. In terms of
day-to-day conditions, the absence of politically significant
violence was the gauge by which stability was measured. In
all, stability was a rather mysterious but prized condition.
When applied to Cuba, this definition was a narrow measure
of that nation's capacity for peaceful internal change. But
in American diplomatic usage, the maintenance of peace
rather than the substance of internal change was the criterion
for non-intervention.
Although this book is a political history, it stresses the use
of American armed forces in the Cuban crisis of 1906 and
the occupation that followed. It emphasizes the role of officers
of the United States Army in the policy-making process and
their relations with their civil superiors in determining both
the character of the Cuban intervention and the programs of
the occupation.
In terms of policy the Army officers serving in Cuba during
the Second Intervention (as differentiated from the one of
1898) influenced the decisions made within the Provisional
Government. More importantly, they favored alternatives to
American policy, which were rejected. They differed with
the United States political leaders by believing American
policy would be best served if basic changes were encouraged
in Cuba's domestic institutions. Unenthusiastic about dealing
with Cuba's professional politicians and placing little faith in
the reforming potential of Cuba's political parties, the officers
realized that supervised elections were essential to the grace
ful liquidation of the occupation, but doubted the wisdom of
both elections and withdrawal. They believed that continued,