CHAPTER THREE
THE SECOND INTERVENTION
F
ROM the oubreak of revolt in Cuba to the
dispatch of the Taft-Bacon Peace Mission,
Roosevelt's major concern was to avoid involving the United
States in a guerrilla war in Cuba. Such a war would quite
likely strip the continental United States of troops, become
expensive in lives and money, and be enormously unpopular
with the American voter. Yet the complex, muddy insurrec
tion in Cuba simmered on, and Roosevelt could not escape
the conclusion that, whatever happened to the Taft-Bacon
negotiations, American forces might be needed in Cuba.
Therefore, as Taft left for Cuba and even as he later met
with the politicos in Havana, the military phase of Roosevelt's
Cuban diplomacy gathered strength. It was to become increas
ingly important in the President's deliberations and in its
effect upon the course of the negotiations of the Taft-Bacon
Mission.
On his way to Havana, Taft detrained in Washington to
assemble his party and to meet with Generals Bell and
Ainsworth to review the plans for the deployment of troops
to Cuba. On September 15 Taft reported to Roosevelt that
the force was organized on paper, orders were ready, and
that the three expeditions (each of approximately six thou
sand men) could be supported logistically.^1 A copy of the
General Staff's plan reached Roosevelt two days later, and
after examining it, he returned it to the War Department
for revision.
2
Roosevelt's major criticism of the General Staff's
plan was that it did not reflect General Funston's recommen