90 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTIONdation that the Army, if it had to fight the insurgents, should
use primarily cavalry and mounted infantry.^3 General Bell
replied that he was more or less in agreement with Funston's
assessment of possible operations and that the back-up (or
second) expedition would be composed solely of cavalry.^4
While the plan emphasized matters of organization, supply,
and transportation, the analysis of the problems of campaign
ing in Cuba and the type of warfare that might be expected
could not have increased Roosevelt's willingness to commit
troops in support of Estrada Palma. The General Staff pointed
out the limitations imposed by Cuba's lack of roads, the
problems of supply and security, and the terrain advantages
a guerrilla force would have in waging a prolonged war.^5
The Army's operations against the insurgents would entail a
long occupation and large numbers of soldiers "for occupy
ing railways, bases of supply and strategic points to enable
mounted troops [to] operate safely in [the] interior."^6 The
British military attache in Washington, after a conversation
with Captain Dwight E. Aultman who had recently returned
from his fact-finding mission to Cuba, believed that as many
as forty thousand soldiers might be needed in Cuba. If so,
Roosevelt would have to raise another thirty-five thousand
men to keep the Army properly prepared, and such men
would be raw recruits not available for immediate service.
A war in Cuba would strip the Army posts in the United
States of all experienced troops capable of national defense
or expeditionary duty elsewhere.^7
Even as Taft and Bacon bargained with the politicos
in Havana and occasionally threatened to land troops, Army
officers in Washington told the press how unappealing they
found the prospects of pacifying Cuba. Members of the Gen
eral Staff saw war in Cuba as "a campaign of chasing and
reconcentration," needing perhaps one hundred thousand
men.^8 The New York Times reported:
Officers who have had experience in the Philippines especially have
no desire to take part in settling the Cuban mess by force. They say
that there is only one way of ending a guerilla campaign down there