Preface viireformist American occupation would best serve the Cuban
people and the interests of the United States.
In addition to describing American civil-military relations
in the Cuban occupation, this study is a history of the use
of American forces as an instrument of national policy and the
political implications of their use in a specific historic situation.
Essentially it deals with the constraints upon the Roosevelt
administration as it worked to resolve the Cuban crisis without
using force. It examines why Roosevelt tried to avoid employ
ing troops and why the decision to occupy Cuba was taken
largely from his hands by events over which he had little
control, but for which he bore some responsibility.
Although the Second Intervention in Cuba involved two
sovereign states, it was, militarily, a problem in applying the
political, economic, psychological techniques of maintaining
internal security. The management of internal security affairs
in Cuba was an Army function, performed by the officers in
the Provisional Government of Charles E. Magoon, the advisers
to Cuba's constabulary, and the Army of Cuban Pacification.
As an internal security operation, the occupation had its ante
cedents in the Army's experiences in Cuba after the Spanish-
American War and in the Philippine Insurrection. Because
of the domestic political reaction to these earlier military
occupations, the Army's activities from 1906 to 1909 were
restricted to the minimum tasks required to establish public
order. As this study demonstrates, the Army was the guarantor
of stability, and its officers were the major architects and
critics of the work of the Provisional Government.