The Politics of Intervention

94 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION

some unscrupulous Americans in Havana. It was true that
Estrada Palma was stubborn, perhaps through age, but it
was also a fact that Mendez Capote and the Moderates would
undercut the President if they felt the need. McCoy and
Cairns agreed that Jose Miguel Gomez was popular, but
Alfredo Zayas was a "scoundrel and shyster... the cheapest
demagogue on the island." Steinhart, on the other hand, was
knowledgeable and absolutely trustworthy.^26
The atmosphere in Havana, as the city awaited the Peace
Mission, was best described by an American reporter: "If the
Queen should lead Alice straight from Wonderland into the
heart of this amazing Cuban war, they would both feel per­
fectly at home."^27 Early on the morning of September 19,
the "Des Moines" anchored in Havana harbor and the Peace
Mission set to work. Amid cheers of "Viva Taft y Bacon...
Viva Mis'tah Roo-velt," Taft stepped ashore in top hat and
morning clothes with Bacon taking advantage of his shadow.
The first conferences were with Dr. Juan O'Farrill, the
Secretary of State, and President Estrada Palma. The latter
gave Taft and Bacon a long lecture on the virtues of his
administration and the treachery of the rebels. If anything
was clear after Estrada Palma finished, it was that compro­
mise was going to be difficult.^28 The commissioners' first con­
cern, however, was to get the insurgents and government
forces to observe the truce declared by Estrada Palma after
the publication of the Gonzalo de Quesada letter. By threat­
ening to land sailors and Marines, Taft, through McCoy,
Ladd, and Cairns, was able to get General Montalvo (the
new Secretary of Government), General Rodriguez, and
Colonel Avalos to hold their positions and the insurgents
(Guerra, Asbert, and Loynaz del Castillo) to do likewise.^29
At the same time, the American officers made a quick tour
of the rebel camps, where they found the insurgents numerous
(around twelve thousand), poorly armed, and quite popular
with the rural people. Clearly, the rebels were capable of
great destruction (estimated at $100 million worth or the size
of American investments), and their foraging was becoming
uncontrolled. The government troops were too few and inef­