The Second Intervention 97probability of their acquiescence."
38
The Moderates and
Estrada Palma, however, held to the position they had pre
sented to Menocal when they learned the "Denver" was on
the way: the elections of 1905 must stand; the Liberal party
must limit "its requirements to the settlement of a future
right."^39 Otherwise, Estrada Palma said, he would not con
tinue in office. He added that the compromise was "useless,"
that the commissioners were "prejudiced," and that it was
"inconsistent with his dignity and honor" to accept such a
solution.^40 Taft's reaction was just what Estrada Palma must
have expected, for the Secretary, despairing of a compromise
and fearing war, asked Roosevelt for more ships and men.^41
The next day, when Estrada Palma again notified Taft he
would resign and take the whole government down, Taft
asked the President's permission to land troops and assume
control of the Cuban government "until a more permanent
policy may be determined."
42
Roosevelt, however, was not yet ready to accept the
inevitability of an American occupation of Cuba. While Taft
was assaulting the Cuban civil war frontally in Havana, the
President was guarding the administration's flanks and rear,
and he was fearful that they were not yet secure. On Septem
ber 22, he had warned Taft that "it is important from the
standpoint of public sentiment here that we shall make it
plain that we are exhausting every effort to come to an
agreement before we intervene."^43
Roosevelt saw the Cuban problem reopening all the old
issues of annexation, imperialism and Army authoritarianism
in the insular possessions. One of his major worries was that
American business interests had financed the revolt, but an
investigation by Frank Cairns indicated that voluntary Ameri
can contributions to the Liberals' war chest had been few.^44
Still there was the problem of Roosevelt's influential Con
gressional critics. Ben Tillman, John Sharp Williams, and
Joseph W. Bailey, he wrote Charles W. Eliot, were always
ready to jump him on the imperialism issue.^45 From within
his own party, he heard from Joseph B. Foraker and Albert G.
Beveridge. The first warned him that it was unconstitutional