112 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
of the subsequent occupation, determining that it would be
peaceful and result in a political victory for the Liberals.
Believing that a failure to protect foreign lives and property
would cause a storm of protest in the United States, Roosevelt
felt compelled to send ships to Cuba. By doing so, he narrowed
his chances of avoiding an occupation.
The Cuban government and the rebels calculated on
winning American influence to their side, and Roosevelt did
nothing to discourage their hope for American intervention.
The Cubans were correct in assuming that Roosevelt could
not let the war go on; they were willing to gamble that inter
vention would work to their advantage. The rebels made the
most astute assessment of American reaction by guessing that
Roosevelt would not fight to support a weak regime estab
lished by rigged elections. The Moderates, on the other hand,
committed a basic mistake when they equated Roosevelt's
bellicose righteousness with a personal freedom to order troops
to fight in defense of law, order, constitutional government,
and the sanctity of property. Insensitive themselves to the
popular restraints upon democratic government, they thought
Roosevelt would risk an unpopular war simply to uphold
political abstractions.
- Taft to Roosevelt, September 15, 1906, Roosevelt Papers.
- Roosevelt to Taft, September 17, 1906, Roosevelt Papers.
- Roosevelt to Brig. Gen. J. F. Bell, September 20, 1906, Roosevelt
Papers. - Bell to Roosevelt, September 22, 1906, Roosevelt Papers.
The revision was incorporated in the Army War College's "Memo
randum to the Assistant Secretary of War," September 22, 1906, Ap
pendix 3 to Serial 11, "Cuba," AWC Doc. File, RG 165. - Part I, Serial 11, "Cuba," September 3, 1906, AWC Doc. File,
RG 165. - Brig. Gen. F. C. Ainsworth to Maj. E. F. Ladd, September 27,
1906, Doc. File 1168399, RG 94. - Memo, Lt. Col. Count Edward Gleichen to Sir H. M. Durand,
British ambassador to the United States, attached to letter, Durand to
Sir Edward Grey, October 5, 1906, FO 371-56, PRO.