The Politics of Intervention

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The Pacification of Cuba 125

Such a high call to duty was part of the Army's tradition,
earlier applied in the Philippines and Cuba, and it is likely
that General Barry's sentiments were shared by his fellow
officers. One, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard, writing
in the Journal of the Military Service Institution, stated that
the Army was playing a positive role in the regeneration of
the Cuban people by its moral example.^11
Many officers in the important staff and command positions
of the Army of Cuban Pacification had had ample experience
in military government in Cuba and the Philippines. Ten
principal staff officers and regimental commanders had Philip­
pine service behind them; three others had played important
roles in the Military Government of Cuba. Colonel William
Pitcher, Twenty-seventh Infantry, for example, bore the sobri­
quet "Ten Dollars or Ten Days" Pitcher from his tour as
Havana chief of police and police judge. Although the influ­
ence of Leonard Wood's proteges was greater in the Provi­
sional Government than in the Army of Cuban Pacification,
several officers had served with him in Cuba and the Philip­
pines. It seems likely that the Army's leadership shared Bul­
lard's view that the Army's position could not be neutral on
questions of public order, justice, and tranquillity.
Whatever the views of its officers on the nature and aims
of the occupation, the Army of Cuban Pacification was
essential in reducing political unrest and public insecurity.^12
Throughout the twenty-eight months of the occupation, the
Army of Cuban Pacification carried out a program for pre­
venting insurgency. The major phases of pacification were:
(1) the physical occupation of Cuba's population centers and
communications network; (2) the use of practice marches
to intimidate the rural population; (3) the establishment of
a nationwide network to collect, analyze, and distribute mili­
tary and political intelligence; (4) the preparation of a
detailed topographic map to aid future counter-guerilla/ban­
dit operations; and (5) active participation in a road-building
program. In all these activities the Army of Cuban Pacification
was successful enough to establish the surface tranquillity

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