148 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTIONsoning, the American Journal of International Law concluded
that "Cuba is in possession of its own government and is not
occupied by the United States."^11 To heighten the illusion,
Cuba carried on formal diplomatic relations (even with the
United States) as a sovereign nation during the occupation,
and the Cuban flag was flown. The administration, by such
acts, pacified Congress as well as Cuba; in voting a supple
mental appropriation for the Army of Cuban Pacification, the
Senate hardly murmured.^12
The Roosevelt administration had no intention of making
the Provisional Government a political issue in the United
States, either by antagonizing the Cubans to the point of
revolt or by encouraging any Congressional debate on the
temporary administration of the island. The Army of Cuban
Pacification was crucial to the first problem, and the Provi
sional Government to both. Roosevelt, with Taft's and Root's
concurrence, decided to use a civilian governor in Cuba,
supervised by Taft through the Bureau of Insular Affairs.
Analyzing Roosevelt's efforts to balance political control of
the Provisional Government against Cuban sensitivity, the
Times of London observed that "red tape is to be lavishly used
in the attempt to bind the wound that Cuban independence
has suffered."^13 Whatever Leonard Wood's virtues (or those
of any other general), Roosevelt wanted a responsive civilian
managing Cuban affairs, someone skilled in compromise and
personal diplomacy, someone knowledgeable in Hispanic law
and of unquestioned loyalty to the administration's goals, a
man who understood the relationship of administration in
Cuba to politics in the United States. Roosevelt's choice, at
Root's suggestion, was Charles Edward Magoon.
Magoon and Wood in CubaIn the selection of a civil governor, Roosevelt was limited
by the fact that the United States had no real colonial civil
service outside of the Army. The only two available candi
dates with the requisite knowledge and sensitivity to policy