The Politics of Intervention

162 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION

nated as quickly as possible, but he was acutely aware that
withdrawing too hastily could bring even greater disaster
than the United States had coped with the previous year.^50
From Washington, British ambassador James Bryce reported
that the administration believed there was little desire among
Americans to annex Cuba. Indeed, Bryce observed, Roosevelt
thought his handling of the Cuban situation had won general
approval. Repeated, endless intervention, in the administra­
tion's view, was preferable to annexation. The administration
believed that the difficulties in the Philippines had created
an underlying public aversion to more colonial experiments,
while travelers from Cuba said that only the larger planters
and commercial elite there favored annexation.^51
It was against this background that Taft returned to Cuba.
During his stay in Havana, he sampled enough conflicting
opinions to become convinced that the date of the elections
should be postponed, but also that the promise of elections
should be reinforced by positive action for their accom­
plishment.^52 Taft's decision to recommend postponement was
based on several factors. First, he found the Liberals, particu­
larly the "military faction/' eager (perhaps too eager) to hold
elections sometime in 1907. One of the Liberals' fears was
that if elections were not held shortly there would be a revolt
which would force an American protectorate. The Liberals
believed a national census, judged essential by the Provisional
Government for fair elections, could be carried out in four
months. Taft, however, thought their fears exaggerated and
their desire for speedy elections offset by their trust in Ameri­
can policy. The Liberals had "blind confidence in the United
States" and would take postponement peacefully.^53
The rise of a conservative opposition party under the
leadership of Rafael Montoro, former minister to Great Britain
and onetime autonomist, also influenced the decision to ask for
postponement.^54 Taft's goal was not necessarily to favor a
conservative party (though emotionally he probably did), but
to give Cuban voters some choice other than the candidates
of the Miguelistas and Zayistas. Talking with conservatives
(whom he called "Conservatives," though the party had not