The Revolt That Never Was 183the politicos, Zayas and Jose Miguel G6mez took the govern
ment's part only at the last minute, although both knew of
the plot. Pina Guerra's help, on the other hand, had been
crucial to checking revolt in Pinar del Rio. To the surprise
of the grateful Military Information Division, he did "excellent
work for the government/'
62
As for the Negro associations, they too continued to grow,
and were organized in the same year as the Independent
Party of Color. For the next five years (1907-12), this third
party tried to arrange patronage for the Negroes by promising
block votes to whomever offered the most favors. The party
was outlawed by a 1910 bill prohibiting racially based parties.
In 1912, in an effort to continue in office, Jose Miguel G6mez
planned a "little" revolt with Evaristo Estenoz, but the affair
flamed into a full race war in which three thousand
Negroes were finally killed by the Cuban Army before the
fighting ended.^63
The basic human material for a revolt was present in 1907,
as in 1906, and the annexationists were convinced, after Taft's
April visit, that 1907 might be the last time Cuban tranquillity
could be sufficiently disturbed to prolong the American occu
pation. Clearly they had sufficient motive to stir up at least
the illusion of rebellion. The statements made by Roosevelt,
Taft, and Cannon suggested that the administration was still
not thoroughly convinced that Cuba was ready for self-
government. All business and political logic demanded con
tinued American occupation. Even if the rebellion threatened
their properties, the business elite was willing to gamble
that the Army of Cuban Pacification could smash the rebels
quickly. At least active fighting might persuade Washington
to replace Magoon with a general and a military government.
This change might have both increased the revolt (and the
chances for annexation) and destroyed the government's
liaison with the Cuban radicals. Even after 1907, the American
annexationists continued to protest the anticolonial trend
in the United States foreign policy, and they were men with
a cause: