The Provisional Government and Cuban Stability 193- the high cost of the necessities of
life: food, clothing, shelter - the small margin of profit on sugar
and tobacco - high interest rates
- low wages for labor
- extortion of wage earners by lenders
- unjust restrictions upon commerce and
shipping imposed by customs regulations - the need for a banking law to protect
savers - the need for a national currency
In his annual report for 1908, Magoon made clear that
Cuba would remain unstable until some revolutionary changes
were made in its national life. Although he did not pre
sume to tell Roosevelt that the United States was responsible
for effecting these changes, Magoon clearly described the
enormity of the needed changes:
- To induce the floating population to select a permanent abiding
place, build habitations and make it their home. - To develop and expand industries so that a larger proportion of the
inhabitants may secure employment and incomes for twelve months in
the year.^7
Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, the senior and most influential
of Magoon's officer-advisers, went further than the Governor
in committing the Provisional Government to the cause of
national reconstruction. In a letter to General J. Franklin Bell,
he pointed out that the Cuban episode was but another in a
long line of Army nation-saving experiences. The work was
"closely allied" to that of Wood's government and "substan
tially identical" to the Army's postwar duties in Mexico and
the South. It was as demanding as the tasks facing admin
istrations in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The effective
fulfilment of the Provisional Government's domestic program
had great significance for both the United States and Cuba: