The Politics of Intervention

208 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION

concerns seem to have been the moral dangers of coeducation
and the growth of "the whole child." Zayas, despondent over
the Cubans' failure to accept Wood's reforms, urged that the
entire public school system be nationalized, but it was not.
61

In 1908, Lieutenant Colonel Bullard became acting secretary.
He was appalled at the corruption he found: sinecures, offi­
cials carrying their mistresses on the payrolls, falsified reports,
kickbacks on supply contracts, promotion for sexual and politi­
cal favoritism. His own mission, he guessed, was to keep the
scandalous conditions hidden until the occupation ended. In
public education, Bullard observed, pacification meant "dealing
out the pie."^62

Politics and Public Health

In the eyes of Major Jefferson Randolph Kean, M.D.,
American policy in the area of public health was poorly
conceived and not well executed.^63 In no other area did the
professional-humanitarian concerns of an American adviser
come into more direct conflict with the Provisional Governor's
political priorities. The basic conflict lay in two areas, the
United States inordinate concern about yellow fever and the
necessity of using the Cuban health service as a political
instrument. From Kean's point of view, the Provisional Gov­
ernment obstructed what he believed were programs designed
to help the Cuban people. The only concession he won
was an administrative one which also benefited Magoon, the
nationalization of the public health service and the creation
of an autonomous Department of Sanitation.
Kean's own service in Cuba dated back to the Military
Government when he had been intimately involved in Wood's
antidisease crusade. Although he realized that the eradica­
tion of yellow fever had been an inspiring accomplishment,
he was perfectly aware that the Cubans themselves were
unconcerned about the disease. They simply did not get it;
the victims were nearly always non-immune Americans and
Europeans.^64