The Politics of Intervention

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214 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION


work to make the national bureaucracy less political by
putting it in the hands of a professional-technical elite.
From Magoon's standpoint this centralization of government
was acceptable not only because it improved administration,
but because it also furthered his political goal, the encourage­
ment of responsible parties in Cuba. Magoon was sure that
a free election would return the politicos to office, and he
saw no reason to exclude them from a voice in his own
government. He doubted that the "example" set by the
American officers would have any lasting impact without
a continuing, direct American presence in the Cuban govern­
ment. This he knew was an unlikely development. Magoon
did agree with Crowder that legal reform could leave a last­
ing impact on Cuba, but he differed on the extent of that
reform. Magoon stopped short of directly altering any insti­
tution other than the government. On this issue, Magoon
was far more conservative than Crowder, who was, in fact,
suggesting basic social changes through the medium of
revising the Hispanic civil and criminal codes.
Although the officers were correct in believing that Magoon's
political policies and the holding of elections were a super­
ficial answer to Cuban instability, their own prescription for
change was at least equally limited. They believed that the
United States intended to do more for Cuba than it did.
They realized more slowly than the American political lead­
ership that the days of civilizing backward peoples in the
missionary manner were at an end. They were interested in
lasting internal reform in Cuba, but the Roosevelt adminis­
tration was not.
In the most important area, that of economic reform, the
officers were as conservative as their civil superiors. That
they were mindful of the important role an efficient, honest
Cuban government could play in national development is
unquestionable, but they had no other answer to Cuba's
colonial economy than freer trade with the United States.
This was, as Roosevelt and Root knew, impossible without
annexation.

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