The Reconstruction of the Cuban Armed Forces 235Whatever his inclination to settle the Permanent Army
question, Taft made no public decision in Havana, for he was
waiting for what Washington considered a compromise solu
tion. Although General Bell had approached the General
Staff board which had mapped the Rural Guard reorganiza
tion, he found it reluctant to approve the Liberal plan. There
fore another scheme, drafted by Major Frank Maclntyre of
the Bureau of Insular Affairs, was submitted. This plan in
corporated the separation of the army and the Rural Guard,
as the Liberals desired, while adopting the organizational
structure advocated by the General Staff board, including a
seven hundred man increase in the Guard. Again citing the
Cuban law of September 15, 1906, Maclntyre placed the
strength of the armed forces at ten thousand.^40 General Bell
approved of this plan. Magoon and Taft were to have dis
cussed the compromise plan in Havana, but did not because
the staff papers were mishandled and did not reach the
Secretary until the end of his trip.
In the meantime President Roosevelt acted on his own to
get a reading of public feeling in Cuba on the proposed army.
He asked William E. Curtis, noted Latin American correspon
dent of the Chicago Record-Herald and former official of the
Pan American Union, to sound out opinion during a trip to
Cuba. Curtis' report could hardly have reassured the President
of the wisdom of the War Department's compromise. Every
one he talked to, Curtis said, opposed the Permanent Army,
except its potential officers. Curtis viewed the army as a
reward to the insurgents, who told him they had too much
prestige to work. He told Roosevelt that "if you could see
the men who will command the proposed army, and the men
who would compose the rank and file it would not be
necessary to discuss this subject." In all, Curtis concluded,
the Cuban army, which would cost $5 million annually, would
waste money better used on roads and schools.^41
When Magoon again (April 23, 1907) asked to postpone
announcing any decision on the Permanent Army, the delay
was promptly approved. Roosevelt and Taft, however, could
not find any other alternative. Six months later, on October 16,