246 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
British property before the Americans withdrew.^13 Opinions
in London were divided; one official observed that the problem
was entirely in Washington's hands:
If the U.S. government wants to come back to Cuba, they will create
disturbances in the island in order to provide a pretext for annexation
or the American capitalists will do so.
If, on the other hand, it is to their interest that things should remain
quiet, they will take steps in that direction and as their troops are to
remain after political evacuation, they can easily do this.^14
Ambassador Bryce had already been investigating the future
of Cuban-American relations and found "singularly little in
terest" in the subject within or without the government.
Roosevelt seldom mentioned Cuba, and any impulse toward
extending American control in the Spanish American republics
seemed to have been "damped down among the people" for
the time being.^15 Bryce had learned, however, through a con
versation between Robert Bacon and an officer in the British
embassy, that Roosevelt's latest public statement did not mean
American troops would be brought home. When the British
official observed that Cuba would then be like Egypt, Bacon
agreed.^16 After reading Grant-Duffs letter, Bryce observed
that the Platt Amendment morally bound the United States
to see that order was maintained. In any event, the size of
American investment in Cuba and the number of American
companies doing business there were in themselves guarantees
of intervention. Troops stationed at Guantanamo Bay would
quite likely be enough to deter revolt. Bryce did report that
Roosevelt told him he would probably withdraw all troops
before his term expired.
17
In late January, Roosevelt, at Root's urging, called Magoon
and Crowder to Washington to discuss Cuban affairs. The
purpose of the meeting, so Magoon understood, was "to devise
[a] plan for exercising [the] power of the United States in
Cuba after withdrawal in such [aj way as to make it less
difficult and less expensive to discharge our obligations."^18
The State Department, since Cuba soon would become its
worry again, wanted to study how this could be accomplished.