248 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
secured." The Provisional Government had enacted many
laws "adapted to the government of a Republic and in
harmony with modern thought ... to give stability to the
government of the Republic of Cuba, or any other Republic."
In addition, Cuba now had an armed force, "a reasonable and
necessary agency for the stability of the Government," ade
quate for the nation's needs and organized so as to reduce
"the danger of militarism." Moreover, the government was
now committed to an ambitious public-works program to offset
seasonal unemployment, reduce unrest, and assist in economic
development. Although the governmental reforms were by no
means completed, the new Cuban administration would start
off "well equipped with the ordinary means and agencies
of stability."
After examining the various proposals to increase American
supervision over the next Cuban government, Magoon re
jected most of them. He feared that to leave American
troops would disturb rather than keep the "moral peace,"
for such a force did not scare the Cubans and the occupation
would disrupt Cuban-American relations. Speck von Stern-
berg's adviser plan, designed to insure that the government
performed on American standards, was feasible, but not, in
Magoon's opinion, likely to be very effective. Nonetheless,
he agreed that advisers to the armed forces and Department
of Justice be left behind if they were acceptable to the
Cuban government.
Magoon made his own policy recommendations. He believed
that the Provisional Government should go on with its legal
reforms, public works, and administrative reorganization. After
withdrawal, he urged both Cuba and the United States to
reduce their tariffs for their mutual benefit. His most inter
esting proposal was that a "high joint commission" of respected
Cubans and Americans be established to settle "contested
elections or other controversies involving the relations of an
administration and any large portion of the population."
Magoon thought that such a "Tribunal" would be an effective
substitute for military intervention as the Cubans could take
their grievances to it rather than rise in revolt.