Restoration and Withdrawal 263the native political class as unprincipled exploiters of the
people, men whose influence must be checked. They blamed
Cuban antisocial behavior as much on ignorance and the
Hispanic cultural heritage (which could be overcome) as on
poverty and biological inferiority, the characteristics that most
repulsed their civilian contemporaries. They believed some
important American values (such as justice, fair play, honesty,
and community co-operation) were transferable and offered
the only real hope of stability. For the moment, however,
American political institutions had best be left at home. An
American military government, on the other hand, the officers
thought, was an appropriate instrument for inculcating the
attitudes of a peaceful citizenry. Since the Army would have
to police the violent societies for which the United States had
assumed responsibility, the officers were anxious to reshape
these societies to their own liking. This is what they attempted
to do, without much satisfaction, in Cuba from 1906 to 1909.
To a large degree, the Army was responsible for the
Provisional Government's successes and had little to do with
its more obvious shortcomings. The Army of Cuban Pacifica
tion kept the peace and thwarted the annexationists, while
the officers of the Provisional Government administered the
government, however restively, under Magoon and his civil
superiors. But in their more far-reaching developmental plans,
the officers were disappointed. Colonel Crowder did not get
the reformed legal codes; Lieutenant Colonel Bullard did
not get a chance to rebuild the educational system; Lieutenant
Colonel Black did not get the better roads and waterworks
he wanted to construct; Lieutenant Colonel Greble did not
have enough time to purge the incompetents from the Depart
ment of Government; Major Kean had to leave the epidemic
disease problem relatively untouched; Major Slocum did not
get the Rural Guard thoroughly professionalized. Paradox
ically, the major institutional change sponsored by the Pro
visional Government, the establishment of the Permanent
Army of Cuba, was opposed by the officers because of its
political and economic implications. They were overruled by
their superiors in Washington and the civil authorities, who