The Politics of Intervention

The Burdens of World Power 15

and demoralize the rebels. Towns and reconcentration camps
must then be securely guarded to prohibit traffic in food from
urban areas. In assessing Spanish measures in Cuba, Furlong
concluded that "the policy of reconcentration became abso­
lutely necessary."
Furlong stated that active military operations against guer­
rillas should be handled by columns of two hundred men,
armed and supplied for maximum speed. Pursuit must be
relentless, and no surrenders should be accepted unless the
guerrilla brought in his weapon.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard brought wider vision
and as much study to his thinking on the problems of pacifi­
cation. With Philippine service that ranged from field opera­
tions as a regimental commander to a provincial governorship,
Bullard, an introspective West Pointer, stressed that political
persuasion rather than military force was the heart of pacifi­
cation.^27 Pacification, he wrote, "is no more than dealing with
a people, handling and governing them according to their
genius and character." This required a policy "composed of
force and persuasion." Patience on the part of the military
was absolutely necessary, but Bullard noted that there was
a tendency to under-react when force was needed, which
often caused greater destruction and bloodshed later. Recon­
centration, however necessary in extreme cases of revolt, must
be humane and well planned or its effects would be disastrous.

Bullard conceded that force alone could not win the final
objective, the consent of the governed. Rather, he pointed out,
the habits and thinking of the people must be gradually
changed; he stressed religious education, the wide application
of medical knowledge, and indoctrination of the young native
political leaders and the children, and, in all matters, respect
for the individual dignity of the people.
Furlong's and Bullard's writings on pacification are signifi­
cant, for they represent the more thoughtful views of the
officer corps. Furlong was detailed to the Military Information
Division of the General Staff, and both officers held important
posts in Cuba during the Second Intervention. There were
other lessons, however, to be learned in the practical study