The Politics of Intervention

30 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION

hugh Lee, the former consul-general of Havana, commanded
Pinar del Rio—Havana; General James H. Wilson was in
charge in Mantazas—Santa Clara; and General Leonard
Wood in Santiago—Puerto Principe. At the national level
Brooke created four civil departments and various fiscal agen­
cies, the first staffed with Cuban secretaries, the latter with
Army officers. The provincial and municipal governments
were continued in the Spanish pattern, the offices filled by
Cubans appointed by the Military Governor and supervised
by the department commanders.^18
More importantly, Brooke and his associates, backed by
the American army, were relatively free of internal political
pressure in Cuba. There was no organized resistance to their
rule, and many Cubans actively co-operated with them. Both
the form and style of the Military Government in 1899 were
near copies of the Spanish regime; the prewar pattern of
arbitrary rule, however concilatory and paternal, continued.
That there was no sharp break with the Spanish colonial
system can be explained in several ways. First, the major
task of the Military Government in its first year was to restore
public order, fight disease and starvation, and provide other
humanitarian services. These chores were accomplished pri­
marily by the American army. In addition, Brooke received
no orders from Washington for governmental reform. Presi­
dent McKinley was still methodically plumbing American
opinion to help determine what to do about Cuba. His public
statements on Cuban policy in 1899 were models of ambiva­
lence. At the War Department, the discredited Russell A.
Alger lingered on as Secretary, and the head of the newly
created Division of Customs and Insular Affairs did not fill
the leadership vacuum. Thus, the initiative for Cuban reform
lay with the Military Government and those Cubans who
could gain the sympathetic ear of an American general.
Faced with massive problems of national reconstruction,
Brooke found much in the Hispanic system of centralized
military-civil administration to recommend itself for his use.
He believed that Spanish law in most cases would adequately
protect both individual rights and property. Implicit in his